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Abstract
The effects of associative strength and gist relations on rates of children’s and adults’ true and
false memories were examined in three experiments. Children aged 5 through 11 and university-
aged adults participated in a standard Deese/Roediger-McDermott false memory task using DRM
and category lists in two experiments and in the third, children memorized lists that differed in
associative strength and semantic cohesion.  In the first two experiments, half of the participants
were primed before list presentation with gist-relevant cues and the results showed that: (1) both
true and false memories increased with age, (2) true recall was higher than false recall for all ages,
(3) at all ages, false memory rates were determined by backward associative strength, and (4) false
memories varied predictably with changes in associative strength but were unaffected by gist
manipulations (category structure or gist priming).  In the third experiment, both gist and
associative strength were varied orthogonally and the results showed that regardless of age,
children’s (5) true recall was affected by gist manipulations (semantic cohesion) and (6) false
recall was affected by backward associative strength.  These findings are discussed in the context
of models of false memory illusions and continuities in memory development more generally.
Keywords: DRM paradigm, false memories, associative-activation theory, memory development,
children’s false memory, semantic density, fuzzy-trace theory.
An Associative-Activation Theory of Children’s and Adults’ Memory Illusions
Recent research has shown that children are less susceptible to false memories than adults
especially when those false memories are generated spontaneously as in the Deese/Roediger-
McDermott (DRM; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) paradigm (Brainerd, Reyna, &
Forrest, 2002; Howe, 2005, 2006, 2008a; Howe, Cicchetti, Toth, & Cerrito, 2004; Howe, Gagnon,
& Thouas, 2008).  Briefly, the DRM task consists of presenting lists of words that are related to
an unpresented concept (e. g., hot, snow, warm, winter, ice, wet, frigid, chilly, heat, weather,
freeze, and air are related to the unpresented item COLD). The unpresented item, also termed the
critical lure, is often reported along with presented list items during subsequent recall or
recognition tasks.
Although the false-memory illusion arising from the DRM paradigm is a robust
phenomenon, it is not clear what mechanisms underlie children’s false memories and why false
memories increase across childhood.  From the adult literature it is generally suggested that the
items on the DRM list directly activate related but unpresented concepts during study and this
happens automatically outside of conscious awareness.  When it is time to recall or recognize the
list items, the unpresented but activated concept is also falsely output because participants cannot
discriminate them from the original list members.
Theoretical explanations of this effect, such as fuzzy-trace theory (FTT), have attempted to
account for these findings by suggesting that there are two memory traces encoded during list
presentation - verbatim and gist (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005).  These traces are qualitatively
different from each other: verbatim traces are concerned with item-specific surface information
(e.g., the number of phonemes in a word) and gist traces with meaning-based information (i.e., the
theme of a word list).  It is this gist trace that is thought to be responsible for false recall in the
DRM paradigm particularly when verbatim traces (which fade more rapidly) are not available.
Gist traces are particularly relevant in recall rather than recognition because the physical presence
of the item in the recognition test is more likely to activate its verbatim trace.  Although gist is not
clearly defined in FTT (e.g., Howe, 2008b), in general it concerns the abstraction of a common
“theme” contained within the presented material (e.g., see Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008).  Thus,
for example, in the DRM paradigm, the gist is the theme of the list.  When categorized or
taxonomic items are used, the category itself serves as the gist.  Not only do word lists contain
gist, but so too do single words – that is, individual words can have their own unique meaning or
local gist that can cause false memories (e.g., Reyna & Lloyd, 1997).  It is the extraction of this
gist that underlies false memory production, particularly when verbatim traces have faded.
Developmentally, although young children are capable of extracting the gist, the ability to do so
improves with age, especially their ability to extract thematic meaning across list items (Brainerd
& Reyna, 2005).  As this ability increases with age, so does the child’s susceptibility to the DRM
illusion.
An alternative explanation, associative-activation theory (AAT), states that children’s false
memories are a product of associative activation processes (Howe, 2005, 2006, 2008b).
Associative relations between list items and the critical lure are important contributors to the false
memory illusion (Deese, 1959; McEvoy, Nelson, & Komatsu, 1999; Roediger, Watson,
McDermott, & Gallo, 2001; Underwood, 1965).  This theory (as well as associative-monitoring
theory, AMT, Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001) derives from spreading activation models that
suggest that the processing of one word activates a corresponding node (i.e., concept) in our
mental lexicon (or more generally, our knowledge base) and this activation spreads to surrounding
concept nodes (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Landauer & Dumais, 1997).  In particular, one word (or
concept) activates another and some of these activated concepts are items that have not been
presented but have been “incorrectly” activated due to their connection with presented items in the
knowledge base.  Howe (2005, 2006, 2008b; Howe et al., 2008) suggests that increases in
children’s false memory with age may be due to changes in children’s knowledge base (e.g.,
accretion of associations, reorganization of knowledge).  This, combined with additional
experience and practice utilizing concepts results in increases in the automaticity with which
children access or activate associations in their knowledge base, including associations that
mediate false remembering.
According to AAT (Howe, 2005, 2006, 2008b; Howe et al., 2008), children’s false
memories, like those of adults, should increase as a function of increasing associative strength
between list items and the critical lure.  However, it is unlikely that young children’s rates of false
memories will be similar to those of older children and adults because concepts and the
associative relations among them are not activated as automatically as they are for adults.  As
demonstrated by studies of memory organization, the quantity and quality of associative relations
between old and newly acquired concepts continue to undergo significant changes with
development (Bjorklund, 1987, 2004).  As children gain knowledge and experience through
exposure and development, their conceptual representations and the associative links among
related concepts become better integrated in memory (Bjorklund, 1987, 2004; Howe, 2000).
Although these changes in the organization of conceptual representations strengthen the links
between related concepts, children’s ability to automatically process these relations and activate
related concepts will depend on their developing cognitive abilities. 
The production of false memories in the DRM paradigm is relatively automatic for adults,
for whom associated but unpresented items, such as the critical lure, are primed through their
associative links with the presented list items.  Children’s ability to process and activate these
items through their associative links with list items is not as automatic (for a review, see Howe,
2000).  The activation of these associative links is effortful for young children, but as children get
older, less cognitive effort is required to process and activate associative links between related
concepts, which in turn increases their susceptibility to the DRM false memory illusion (Howe,
2005; Metzger et al., 2008).  For example, Howe (2005) found that young children are able to
inhibit false memories suggesting that they are less automatic per se.  In this study children were
presented with two DRM lists.  After the first list had been presented children either received
remember instructions (“keep remembering the words on this list”) or forget instructions (“this
was just a practice list, you can forget it”) and then told to remember the second list.  A third
control group received no instructions and served as a baseline for true and false memory rates.
The results showed that children in the forgetting condition had significantly fewer false
memories than children in the control condition whereas children in the remember condition had
significantly more false memories than children in the control condition.  If false memories
occurred automatically at the time of encoding or retrieval, as they do in adults (see Kimball &
Bjork, 2002), inhibition would have been extremely difficult.  The fact that children were able to
inhibit false memories suggests that they are less automatic than for adults.  Therefore, consistent
with the predictions of AAT, it is likely that as the automaticity of associative activation increases
with age so too does children’s susceptibility to false memory illusions.
FTT contains no assumptions about the role of consciousness and automaticity in the
development of the false memory illusion (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Brainerd et al., 2006).
However, FTT differs from AAT on other important dimensions, ones in which distinct
predictions can be derived and tested.  One critical difference between AAT and FTT is that
according to AAT, activation spreads from one word or concept representation to another whereas
according to FTT it spreads from a word or list of words to an extracted gist (e.g., thematic
representation) to additional representations consistent with the extracted gist.  In other words, in
AAT concepts directly activate each other in the knowledge base whereas in FTT there is an
additional, mediated step involving a separate thematic representation that must be extracted prior
to the activation of additional, nonpresented words or concepts.  Unlike FTT, AAT does not
require the separate activation of a theme or gist trace in order for false memories to occur.
What does the empirical research say about these two theories?  Because gist effects are
said to be more likely using recall than recognition measures (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2008), we focus
primarily on studies that report recall data.  First, consider studies on gist-cuing manipulations.
Here, experiments have shown that when gist is manipulated in children’s recall, false memory
rates can be elevated, a finding that on the surface supports FTT (e.g., Brainerd, Forrest, Karibian,
& Reyna, 2006; Holliday, Reyna, & Brainerd, 2008; Odegard, Holliday, Brainerd, & Reyna,
2008).  For example, 11-year-olds were more likely to produce false memories when they
received additional cue words at study that biased the context toward, rather than away, from the
gist of a list (Odegard et al., 2008).  However, the interpretation of this outcome is problematic for
a number of reasons.  For example, because there was no control group that did not receive any
gist manipulation, it is difficult to say whether the toward-condition elevated false memories, the
away-condition lowered false memories, or both.  Moreover, the manipulation itself may not have
been purely gist-based inasmuch as the words used as additional cues to meaning may simply
have served to increase the associative activation of the unpresented critical lure.
In another study, false memory rates increased when children were told beforehand that
they would be presented with words that have similar meanings.  This effect was larger for
younger (6- and 11-year-olds) than for older (14-year-olds) children (Brainerd et al., 2006).  This
is what FTT would anticipate because younger children have more problems extracting gist than
older children and, therefore, gist instructions should have a more pronounced effect at a younger
age.  It is not clear, however, how instructing children to look for something they cannot easily
extract (i.e., gist) should increase their ability to do so.  Alternatively, reminding children to look
for meaningful relations in studied material is but one metamemory instruction that may affect
children’s ability to search for interitem associative connections, connections they already possess
but may fail to activate automatically (e.g., see Schneider & Pressley, 1997).
Other studies have found that gist-like manipulations affect children’s false memory rates,
although these effects do not interact with age.  For example, although Holliday et al. (2008)
found that, contrary to their expectation, false recall rates increased similarly for 7- to 13-year-
olds when specific thematic labels were given before list presentation (e.g., “the words you will
hear are all related in meaning, they are all medical words”).  Howe (2006) found that presenting a
label (e.g., animals) prior to categorized (taxonomic) lists did not increase false recall for 5- to 11-
year-olds.  Overall, then, the empirical evidence from gist-cuing studies reporting recall data is
inconsistent and difficult to interpret due to methodological differences (e.g., the use of DRM
versus category lists) across studies.
Second, the AAT interpretation is favored by dissociations of true and false recall.
Hutchison and Balota (2005) with adults and Howe (2006) with children found that within-list
thematic relations affected true but not false memories and that associative relations influenced
both, but had a greater effect on false memories.  Park, Shobe, and Kihlstrom (2005) also
demonstrated that categorical relations elicited fewer false memories than associative relations in
studies of adults’ true and false recall.  Moreover, children’s true recall increases when categorical
lists are presented in contrast to DRM lists, but there are no differences for false recall (Howe,
2006).  Thus, contrary to predictions from gist-based theories, neither adults’ nor children’s false
memories increase when provided with lists that emphasize a single, thematic relationship.
Concerning manipulations of associative relations, lists that are high in backward associative
strength produce more false recall than lists low in backward associative strength, but these lists
do not exhibit different rates of true recall (e.g., Howe et al., 2004).  Moreover, Hege and Dodson
(2004) with adults and Howe (2006) with children have shown that when associative processing is
significantly reduced but semantic processing remains intact (e.g., using pictorial stimuli rather
than verbal stimuli; also see Chiarello, 1998), true recall rates are unaffected but false recall rates
are significantly reduced and age effects in false recall rates disappear (also see Howe, 2008a).
Third, and perhaps the strongest evidence for an associative-activation model comes from
research, already mentioned, that has shown that associative strength is crucial for false memory
production.  The strength of the associative links between list items (e.g., bed) and the critical lure
(e.g., SLEEP), also termed backward associative strength (BAS), is indicative of a list’s ability to
produce false memories in children and adults.  That is, lists with very little mean BAS yield low
rates of false memories (Gallo & Roediger, 2002; Howe et al., 2004).  Similarly, recent findings
have indicated that the strength of associative links between the critical lure (e.g., SLEEP) and the
list items (e.g., bed), also referred to as forward associative strength (FAS), can influence the
production of false memory in adults, although these studies only examined recognition (Brainerd
& Wright, 2005).
Strictly speaking, the finding that associative strength between list items and the critical
lure, whether forward or backward, plays a key role in adults’ production of false memories is
difficult for gist-based theories to accommodate.  For example, because BAS is a measure
between list items and their direct activation of the nonpresented critical lure, it is unclear what
advantage accrues to such models by imposing the added step of having to first extract the overall
gist of the list before false memories are produced.  If BAS is a measure of the extent to which a
presented item directly activates nonpresented but related concepts, what advantage is associated
with imposing an intermediary step (gist extraction) that makes this relationship indirect?  On the
face of it, this seems to be a more complex explanation than is demanded by the data.
Alternatively, gist-based theories could always counter with the assumption that BAS and
FAS are proxy variables for gist.  Although it is clear that global measures such as BAS and FAS
can be further delineated (e.g., broken down into different meaning components; see Brainerd,
Yang, Reyna, Howe, & Mills, in press; Roediger, Watson et al., 2001), such arguments may still
be problematic because associations are typically viewed in the broadest sense, referring to any set
of concepts that can be mentally linked (e.g., contiguity, co-occurrence, taxonomic membership,
conceptual, orthographic, or phonemic similarity, and so forth) (see Gallo, 2006; Howe, 2008b).
Gist, on the other hand, is often viewed as being more restricted, referring instead to a theme “…
that subjects can form (and remember) to summarize or categorize the words” (Gallo, 2006, p.
40).  Thus, in contemporary models, gist is viewed as a subset of the more general class of
relationships between concepts denoted by the term association.  Even if gist was to be broadened
to encompass what has traditionally been the province of associationism for well over a century
and a half (e.g., Hamilton, 1859), such theories can still founder due to their insistence that the
additional step of gist extraction is necessary for the occurrence of false memories.
Howe (2005, 2006, 2008b; Howe et al., 2008) has suggested that these same associative
mechanisms that account for adults’ false recall can also be used to understand children’s false
memory illusions.  Although there is some support for this proposition, experiments that have
directly and systematically compared the impact of variation in FAS or BAS on true and false
rates have yet to be conducted with children, something that is one focus of the current research.
Two studies have shown that variation in BAS does affect children’s false recall and that these
effects are more pronounced for older than younger children (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2006; Howe et
al., 2004).  These and other recent findings suggest that developmental trends in false memory
illusions are related to increases in the activation of associative links that may already exist
between concepts rather than children’s growing ability to extract meaning across list items (i.e.,
gist-across-the-list).
As noted, associations are multidimensional and consist of many different stimulus
elements that overlap (e.g., phonological, orthographic, temporal contiguity, spatial proximity,
superordinate relations, property relations, physical or conceptual similarity; also see Brainerd et
al., in press; Roediger, Watson et al., 2001).  Associative strength is determined by the
relationship between items that exists on the basis of any one dimension of similarity or may
involve many dimensions that overlap.  Research on children’s memory organization has
confirmed that associative links between concepts appear at a relatively young age and are further
strengthened and defined with increases in both knowledge and experience (Bjorklund, 1987;
Frankel & Rollins, 1985).  It has also been established that children can use associative relations
very early in life, although the nature and type of association changes with age and experience
(e.g., Lange, 1978).  Research on the development of conceptual organization in memory has
indicated that both younger and older children rely on associative (including categorical) links
between concepts to guide the recollection process (Bjorklund, 2004).  With development children
gain more experience and knowledge and their ability to automatically activate and use
associative relations to guide recollection improves (Bjorklund, 2004; Howe et al., 2008).  Given
that conditions are made favorable, even very young children can activate associative (including
categorical) relations and use them to mediate recollection (e.g., Frankel & Rollin, 1985).  For
example, increasing the salience of categorical information by blocking similar category items
together can facilitate the processing of such relations for young children (Howe, Brainerd, &
Kingma, 1985).  Of course blocking information by category is the same as presenting a DRM list
– all items are related to a prototype (category lists) or the one associative item (DRM lists).
            Research on children’s false memories has shown that children as young as five years old,
like older children and adults, can spontaneously extract categorical relations across word lists
(Howe, 2006).  In this study, young children’s rates of true and false recall were not influenced by
the provision of superordinate category cues prior to list presentation. Despite their ability to
spontaneously extract the thematic relationship across lists’ items (i.e., category lists were better
recalled than DRM lists), young children’s rates of true and false recall remained lower than that
of older children and adults.  Indeed, providing gist-consistent descriptive cues did not increase
children’s false recall.  Even when categorical (e.g., banana, pear, orange) and DRM items (e.g.,
core, red, pie) were used to cue the same critical lure (e.g., APPLE), children’s false recall rates
are controlled by variations in associative strength, not the availability of an overarching, thematic
cue (Howe, Wimmer, & Blease, in press).  A tentative conclusion from research like this is that
children’s ability to extract meaning across word lists is unrelated to their lower susceptibility to
false memory illusions.  Instead, as proposed by theories relying on associative activation,
children’s false memories, like adults’, result from the activation of associative relations between
list items and the critical lure.
The role of associative strength in the production of false memories has mostly focused on
the influence of list items’ backward associative links to the critical lure and has been limited to
adults.  Studies with adults have indicated that variations in a list’s total, rather than mean, BAS
can directly influence the occurrence of false memories in the DRM paradigm (Robinson &
Roediger, 1997).  More specifically, Robinson and Roediger (1997) found that false recall
increased in parallel with the addition of related items to increase both list length and total
associative strength.  On the other hand, adding unrelated associates to keep list length constant
did not change rates of false recall, but rather was limited to decreasing rates of true recall.  Given
these results, it appears that a list’s total, rather than mean, BAS influences false recall.  Veridical
recall, on the other hand, is diminished when unrelated exemplars disrupt the associative
coherence of a list.  Again, the effects of associative relations between list items and the critical
lure appear to be limited to false memories.
Unlike BAS, FAS has not been significantly associated with the production of false
memories during free recall (although this may be an artifact of the restricted range or variability
of measures of FAS).  Indeed, previous studies on false recall have failed to find a significant
relationship between FAS and false memories (see McEvoy et al., 1999; Roediger, Watson et al.,
2001).  However, recent findings have indicated that, when manipulated within lists mean forward
associative strength (MFAS), even when limited in range, can influence false memory production
in adults.  Using eight 4-item lists with varying BAS and FAS, Brainerd and Wright (2005) found
that lists with high FAS or BAS produced higher rates of false recognition.  More specifically,
lists for which either FAS or BAS or both were high produced the highest proportions of false
recognition.  It appears that at least for recognition, adults’ false memories can be influenced by
the lure’s associative links to the list items.
Overall, then, the effects of associative strength appear to be stronger when it comes to the
production of false recall, as true recall is often less affected by the strength or direction of
associative links between list items and the critical lure.  In addition, true and false recall are
affected differently by gist-like manipulations (e.g., ones that emphasize vertical connectivity
such as categorical or thematic structure) and associative coherence.  Categorical or thematic
coherence of word lists has been found to influence rates of true but not false recall in both
children (Howe, 2006) and adults (Hutchison & Balota, 2005).  In fact, Hutchison and Balota
(2005) found that increasing the number of meaning-consistent items in word lists increased
accurate recall without affecting rates of false recall.  This was also found with children, for
whom category lists produced better true recall than DRM lists, but there was no effect on
children’s false memories (Howe, 2006; Howe et al., in press).
Although it is known that associative strength plays an important role in the production of
adult’s false memories, few studies have examined these effects with children. The goal of the
current article is to provide more definitive evidence of the primacy of associative activation in
the development of false memory illusions, linking children’s memory development in this
domain to that observed with adults.  Although such memory continuity effects have been
observed in the development of accurate remembering (for a review, see Howe, 2000), the same
has not been true for false memory illusions.  In what follows, we present three experiments that
examine the role of associative strength in children’s and adults’ false recall patterns.  Across
experiments we seek evidence of the continuity of memory development.  Along the way, we
provide a number of tests of FTT’s and AAT’s predictions about developmental patterns of false
memory illusions.  We begin by describing the first two experiments, ones that provide tests of
explicit manipulations of gist (use of category lists and labels) and associative strength (different
variations in associative strength).  We then describe a third experiment, one in which gist
manipulations are more implicit (variation in the semantic cohesion or density of the list) and are
directly contrasted with variation in associative strength.  To anticipate, the findings (a) are more
consistent with AAT’s predictions of developmental patterns in false memory illusions than
FTT’s and (b) provide strong evidence of developmental continuity in the emergence of false
memory illusions, consistent with that known to exist for the development of accurate
remembering.
Overview of Experiments 1 and 2
As seen, developmental increases in false memory may be related to the development of
automaticity in associative activation (AAT) rather than an inability to extract gist across list
items (FTT).  In the first two experiments, we examine this more closely by varying associative
strength.  In the first experiment, we varied both BAS and FAS.  In the second experiment, we
manipulated associative strength by removing either the strongest BAS items from each list or
several weaker ones that reduced list BAS by the same amount as removing the strongest
associate.  In order to derive different predictions for FTT and AAT, associative strength was
varied across both categorical/thematic lists and DRM lists.  Although previous findings on the
dissociation of true and false memories have shown that categorical/thematic information
primarily affects true recall (Howe, 2006; Hutchison & Balota, 2005), these effects have been
demonstrated using a between-subjects design.  In order to examine this dissociation with more
precision, we examined the effects of category and associative (DRM) lists using a within-subject
design.
Both FTT and AAT predict that (a) true and false recall should increase with age and (b)
children’s and adults’ true memories should be greater for category than for DRM lists.  However,
the two theories differ when it comes to false memory production.  The key prediction from AAT
is that false memory should increase with increases in the list’s BAS independently of the greater
gist salience for category than DRM lists.  Thus, lists with high FAS and BAS should generate
more false memories than lists with lower FAS and BAS (Experiment 1) and lists with higher
BAS, regardless of whether only a single strong item is removed or several weak items are
eliminated, should generate more false memories than lists with lower BAS (Experiment 2).  FTT,
on the other hand, predicts the same outcome for false memory as it does for true memory.  That
is, to the extent that categorical lists contain a single gist, thereby increasing the probability that
its gist will be more easily discerned, category lists should produce higher false memory rates than
DRM lists which can contain multiple “gists” or associative relations.  FTT also predicts a
developmental interaction.  Because older children and adults are more likely to apprehend these
implicit cues, these effects should be more pronounced with younger children.  To our knowledge,
this will be the first time that the role of FAS and BAS (Experiment 1) and overall list strength
(Experiment 2) on false memories in categorized and DRM lists has been examined
developmentally.
A second manipulation was used to discriminate FTT and AAT, namely, the provision of
explicit cues (labels) prior to list presentation, something that should prime across-the-list gist.
This should be the optimum time to present gist cues as it has been shown that, at least for adults,
encoding is a primary locus of false memory formation for both category and DRM lists
(Dewhurst, Bould, Knott, & Thorley, in press).  For category lists, the category label was given
prior to list presentation to cue the vertical gist (e.g., “fruit” was presented before reading the list
“orange, banana, …”).  For DRM lists, a word or phrase describing what was common across the
list was presented (e.g., for the “doctor” list, the cue was “medical things”).  As noted earlier,
AAT predicts that these labels should only increase false recall rates if they change the overall
activation of the critical lure (i.e., that they too are associatively related to the critical lure).  FTT,
on the other hand, predicts that these labels should increase false recall rates, particularly in
younger children who are said to be less able to spontaneously extract gist across the list.
Overall, then, according to AAT, associative activation is the crucial mechanism that
accounts for children’s false memories and therefore false recall rates should be directly related to
fluctuations in associative strength.  For FTT, although false recall rates should increase with age,
gist manipulations should increase false recall rates in general, but also exhibit two different
developmental effects.  (1) Category lists should yield higher false recall rates than DRM lists,
particularly for younger children who are less able to extract gist spontaneously.  This is because
category lists contain a single, dominant thematic connectivity among items, something not
always possessed by DRM lists.  (2) Explicit gist cues at encoding should also increase false
recall rates for both category and DRM lists, but particularly for younger children who are not as
likely to extract gist spontaneously.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, BAS and FAS were varied systematically across both category and
DRM lists, allowing us to examine the role of associative relations in the development of false
memories independently of across-the-list-gist relations.  The role of BAS in false memory
production has been well established in adult research but the role of FAS is less clear.  The few
previous studies with adults have found small significant effects for FAS that are much smaller
than BAS effects, but these findings have been usually limited to measures of recognition.  Given
that gist plays a more important role in recall, it is important to examine the relative influence of
BAS and FAS using this more gist-sensitive response measure.  Moreover, the role of FAS in
relation to BAS has never been investigated in children’s false memories and it is therefore crucial
to explore this further.  Although our implementation of this factor in the current design was
purely exploratory, it was nonetheless expected that FAS would influence rates of false memories.
 However, this effect may be limited to cases where explicit cues were provided, particularly for
children.   That is, although descriptive labels failed to increase rates of true and false recall in
children (Howe, 2006), levels of FAS were not controlled in those studies.  Results from research
with adults has indicated that for category lists, output frequency of the list items during the
production of category norms did influence rates of false recall when a descriptive cue was
provided (Smith, Ward, Tindell, Sifonis, & Wilkenfeld, 2000).  Thus, although it was expected
that young children are capable of extracting gist across the list without explicit cues, descriptive
labels of category lists, through their forward associative links to the critical lure, may be more
effective in priming their list’s top category exemplars (the critical, unpresented item), resulting in
higher false memory rates for participants provided with descriptive labels.  A similar effect might
occur for DRM lists. More specifically, descriptive labels could prime the DRM list items as well
as the critical lure in instances where backward (or forward) associative links were weak.
Method
Participants
A total of 250 children [48% male; 86 5-year-olds (M = 5.5, SD = 5 months), 80 7-year-
olds (M = 7.6, SD = 6 months), and 84 11-year-olds (M = 11.5, SD = 4 months)] were recruited.
All children (predominantly White and middle class) were tested following parental consent and
their own assent on the day of testing.  A sample of 60 university students (M = 18.6, SD = 9
months) was also recruited and tested following informed consent.  Participants were randomly
assigned to the label and no label conditions, with half of the participants per age group (50%
male) assigned to each condition.
Design, materials, and procedure
A 2(List: DRM vs. Category) x 3(Strength: High BAS-High FAS vs. High BAS-Low FAS
vs. Low BAS-High FAS) x 4(Age: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11- vs. 18-year-olds) x 2(Labels: No labels vs.
Labels) design was used where list and associative strength were manipulated within subject and
age and labels were between-subjects variables. (Note that a Low BAS –Low FAS condition was
not included because such conditions routinely produce floor effects in false memory rates.
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room.  Twelve 14-item lists (6 DRM lists
and 6 category lists; see Appendix A) were presented to each participant.  Associative strength
varied between lists with each participant being exposed to 4 High BAS-High FAS lists (2 DRM
and 2 category), 4 High BAS-Low FAS lists (2 DRM and 2 category), and 4 Low BAS-High FAS
DRM lists (2 DRM and 2 category).  Mean word frequencies did not differ for list items, t(10) =
1.56, p = .15, or for critical lures between DRM and category lists, t(10) = -1.41, p = .19.  Neither
did mean word frequency differ for list items, F(2, 11) = 1.91, p = .20, or for the critical lures
between the three conditions (High/High vs. High/Low vs. Low/High), F(2, 11) = 1.18, p = .35
(word frequencies were taken from Stuart, Masterson, Dixon, & Quinlan (1993-1996)).
Lists were read aloud by the experimenter at a 3-second rate per item.  Half of the
participants in each age group received a descriptive label prior to hearing each list whereas the
other half did not.  Descriptive labels for category lists consisted of the category name included in
the norms (van Overschelde, Rawson, & Dunlosky, 2004).  Labels for the DRM lists (see the
Appendix A) were constructed to highlight the shared semantic relations across list items and
were drawn from Roediger, Watson et al. (2001).  All lists have been used previously with
children and adults in these age ranges (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2002; Howe, 2005, 2006, 2008a;
Howe et al., 2008; Roediger, Watson et al., 2001; Seamon, Luo, Schlegel, Greene, & Goldberg,
2000).  In order to connect the present research with previous studies investigating label effects, it
was also necessary to use labels that have already been implemented in prior research, ones that
have been shown to affect false memory rates (e.g., Holliday et al., 2008).  Finally, as in previous
studies, the critical target for category lists consisted of the highest frequency word (most typical
exemplar) for the selected category.  DRM and category lists were selected on the basis of
mean1 BAS and FAS as determined using the University of South Florida norms (Nelson,
McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1999).  In cases where associative strength was not available, the
Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus (EAT) was consulted (Kiss, Armstrong, Milroy, & Piper, 1973).
 DRM lists were also selected on the basis of mean BAS and FAS as indicated in the Roediger,
Watson et al. (2001) norms.  Mean FAS and BAS are shown in Table 1.
Prior to the presentation of the first list, participants were given general memory
instructions to listen carefully to the words on the list as they would be asked to recall the words
later.  Following these instructions, participants in the label condition were given a descriptive
label describing the theme of the list prior to list presentation.  Participants in the no label
condition simply received the word list.  Following list presentation, participants were given a 30-
second distractor task (circling randomized pairs of letters) prior to recall.  Once recall was
complete, the next cycle began.  This procedure was repeated for the remaining 11 lists.  Items
were presented in the usual descending order of BAS.  All presentation and recall was oral and list
order was randomized within each age group.
Results and Discussion
            Preliminary analyses indicated no main effect or interactions involving gender so this
variable was eliminated from subsequent analyses.  Consistent with the hypotheses for this study,
rates of true and false recall will be analyzed separately.  Throughout this article, effect sizes ((2)
refer to partial eta2.
True Recall
            The proportion of items correctly recalled was analyzed using a 2(List: DRM vs. category)
x 3(Strength: High BAS-High FAS vs. High BAS-Low FAS vs. Low BAS-High FAS) x 2(Label:
No label vs. label) x 4(Age: 5-, 7-, 11-, and 18-year-olds) analysis of variance (ANOVA).  The
results showed a main effect for list, F(1, 302) = 242.23, p < .001, (2 = .45, where the mean
proportion of true recall for category lists (M = .44) was greater than that for DRM lists (M = .35).
 There was also a main effect for age, F(3, 302) = 487.47, p < .001, (2 = .83, where post-hoc
Newman-Keuls tests (p < .05) revealed that 5-year-olds (M = .18) recalled less than 7-year-olds
(M = .30) who recalled less than 11-year-olds (M = .43) who recalled less than 18-year-olds (M =
.67).  Finally, there was a main effect for strength, F(2, 604) = 49.71, p < .001, (2 = .14, where
post-hoc tests showed that BAS was the critical determinant for true recall, with High BAS-High
FAS lists (M = .41) and High BAS-Low FAS lists (M = .41) yielding more true recall than Low
BAS-High FAS lists (M = .37).
In addition, four first-order interactions emerged, three of which involved age.  The one
interaction that did not involve age was between List x Strength, F(2, 604) = 42.63, p < .001, (2 =
.12, where post-hoc tests confirmed that although High BAS yielded the best recall for both DRM
and category lists, and that category lists were better recalled than DRM lists, each list type had a
unique ordering of strength relations.  That is, for DRM lists, the ordering was High BAS-High
FAS (M = .38) > High BAS-Low FAS (M = .34) > Low BAS-High FAS (M = .33), whereas for
the category lists the ordering was High BAS-Low FAS (M = .48) > High BAS-High FAS (M =
.43) > Low BAS-High FAS (M = .40).
The three interactions involving age were as follows.  First, there was an Age x List
interaction, F(3, 302) = 9.56, p < .001, (2 = .09.  As can be seen in the left panel of Table 2, and
was confirmed by post-hoc tests, although category lists were better recalled than DRM lists at all
ages, this gap increased with age up until 11-year-olds and then decreased with adults.  Second,
there was an Age x Strength interaction, F(6, 604) = 22.73, p < .001, (2 = .18.  As can be seen in
the left panel of Table 3, and was confirmed by post-hoc tests, there were no differences in true
recall due to strength for 5- and 7-year-olds but the two High BAS lists were better recalled than
the Low BAS list for 11- and 18-year-olds.  Third and last, there was an Age x Label interaction,
F(3, 302) = 5.02, p < .01, (2 = .05.  As can be seen in Table 4 and was confirmed by post-hoc
tests, label conditions were better than no labels conditions for all child age groups but there were
no differences for adults.
Although some of these patterns for FAS (Brainerd & Wright, 2005) and category versus
DRM lists (Howe, 2006; Seamon et al, 2000) have been observed in prior studies, many have not
been previously reported.  For example, all age groups tended to recall more targets for category
than DRM lists but only older children and adults true recall was affected by variation in
associative strength.  Interestingly, descriptive labels aided all children’s true recall by
approximately the same magnitude (also see Howe, 2006), but had no effect on adults’ true recall.
A full discussion of these trends will be deferred until after the false recall findings are presented.
False Recall
The proportion of critical lures falsely recalled was analyzed using a 2(List: DRM vs.
category) x 3(Strength: High BAS-High FAS vs. High BAS-Low FAS vs. Low BAS-High FAS) x
2(Label: No label vs. label) x 4(Age: 5-, 7-, 11-, and 18-year-olds) ANOVA.  The results showed
a main effect for list, F(1, 302) = 10.29, p < .001, (2 = .03, where the mean proportion of false
recall for category lists (M = .31) was greater than that for DRM lists (M = .26).  Recall that
previous research has not found differences in false memory rates across list type (Howe, 2006;
Howe et al., in press).  That such an effect was obtained here might cause some to interpret this as
evidence for FTT, particularly as average BAS was lower for category than DRM lists, suggesting
that something other than BAS (e.g., gist) was driving false memory rates.  However, such an
interpretation would be incorrect.  Not only was there a main effect for label, F(1, 302) = 7.14, p <
.01, (2 = .02, where no labels resulted in lower false recall rates (M = .26) than labels (M = .31),
but, more important, a List x Label interaction, F(1, 302) = 7.32, p < .01, (2 = .02.  Post-hoc tests
showed that there were no differences in false recall rates for DRM (M = .26) and category (M =
.26) lists in the no label condition, but rates of false recall were higher for category (M = .35) than
DRM (M = .27) lists when labels were present.  Importantly, as we show subsequently, consistent
with AAT but not FTT, this effect was due to higher associative strength relations between labels
and the critical lures in category than DRM lists.
There were two other main effects, one for age, F(3, 302) = 40.59, p < .001, (2 = .29,
where post-hoc Newman-Keuls tests (p < .05) revealed that 5-year-olds (M = .14) falsely recalled
less than 7-year-olds (M = .25) who falsely recalled less than 11-year-olds (M = .34) who falsely
recalled less than 18-year-olds (M = .41), and one for strength, F(2, 604) = 114.45, p < .001, (2 =
.28, where post-hoc tests showed that, like true recall, BAS was the critical determinant for false
recall, with High BAS-High FAS lists (M = .35) and High BAS-Low FAS lists (M = .35) yielding
more false recall than Low BAS-High FAS lists (M = .15).  Three more first-order interactions
emerged as well as a second-order interaction.  First, there was a List x Strength, F(2, 604) =
107.25, p < . 001, (2 = .26, where post-hoc tests confirmed that although High BAS yielded the
greatest false recall for both DRM and category lists, like true recall, each list type had a unique
ordering of strength relations.  That is, for DRM lists, the ordering was High BAS-High FAS (M =
.45) > High BAS-Low FAS (M = .26) > Low BAS-High FAS (M = .08), whereas for the category
lists the ordering was High BAS-Low FAS (M = .45) > High BAS-High FAS (M = .25) > Low
BAS-High FAS (M = .22).  These patterns for false recall are the same as those obtained for true
recall.  Second, there was an Age x List interaction, F(3, 302) = 6.16, p < .001, (2 = .09.  As can
be seen in the right panel of Table 2, and was confirmed by post-hoc tests, category lists yielded
higher false recall than DRM lists up to 11-year-olds and then no difference for adults.  Third,
there was an Age x Strength interaction, F(6, 604) = 19.17, p < .001, (2 = .16.  As can be seen in
the right panel of Table 3, and was confirmed by post-hoc tests, there were no differences in false
recall due to strength for 5-year-olds but the two High BAS lists yielded higher false recall than
the Low BAS lists for 7-, 11-, and 18-year-olds.
Finally, there was an Age x List x Strength interaction, F(6, 604) = 8.78, p < .001, (2 = .08.
 As can be seen in Panels A and B of Figure 1, and was confirmed by post-hoc tests, both the
High BAS-High FAS and High BAS-Low FAS lists produced greater false recall than Low BAS-
High FAS lists for all age groups.  The interaction occurs because (a) for category lists, High BAS-
Low FAS lists produced greater false recall for children but the reverse held for adults and (b) for
DRM lists, false recall rates were greater for High BAS-High FAS lists than High BAS-Low FAS
lists for all age groups except the youngest (5-year-olds).  Thus, false memories increased with
age like true memories.  As well, BAS was strongly predictive of false recall levels.  That is,
strong associative relations in both directions (High BAS-High FAS) increased false recall rates
for DRM and category lists for adults and increased false recall rates for children on DRM lists.
The pattern is less clear for category lists where High BAS-Low FAS but not High BAS-High
FAS increased false recall rates for children.  However, despite this, the overall pattern is very
consistent: in all cases, high BAS had a significant effect on children’s false memory production
and this was independent of gist manipulations.
Together, these results are more consistent with the predictions from AAT’s
conceptualization of false memory and its development than with FTT’s.  That is, false recall rates
were directly related to the list’s associative strength, particularly BAS, regardless of whether
those lists were mainly associative (DRM) or categorical.  In fact, whereas true recall was
negatively (but not significantly) related to BAS (r(11) = -.125, p = .35; category r(5) =   -.112;
DRM r(5) = -.145), false recall was positively (and significantly) related to BAS (r(11) = .505,
p < .05; category r(5) = .408; DRM r(5) = .534).  This dissociation was observed regardless of
whether labels were present or not and whether lists were DRM or categorical.
Interestingly, when false recall rates were higher in category than DRM lists, this effect
was restricted to conditions in which category labels were explicitly presented prior to the
category list itself.  That is, for false recall, regardless of age, descriptive labels selectively
increased (primed) rates of false recollection for category but not DRM lists.  Although at first
blush this may be seen as consistent with FTT’s claim that labels aided children’s and adults’
processing of gist across the list, it is not.  First, if such were the case, we would have anticipated
the same effects for DRM lists when given an appropriate organizing label.  This was not
observed.  Second, FTT anticipates an interaction of labeling with age.  That is, because younger
children are particularly deficient in gist processing, the labeling effect should have been larger
for younger children than older children and adults.  Again, no such interaction emerged, a finding
consistent with that of Holliday et al. (2008).
Third, and finally, it turns out that that this finding is consistent with AAT’s prediction
that labels can serve to increase false memory rates when they increase associative activation of
the critical lure.  That is, this effect appears to be most likely related to the strong associative
relations between the critical lure and descriptive labels for category, but not DRM, lists.  In fact,
further investigation revealed stronger associative relations between the critical lures (top
exemplars from category norms) and the descriptive labels for category lists (M  = .34) than for
DRM lists (M  = .13) and this difference is significant, t(10) = 2.06, p < .05.  Using a partial
correlational analysis and holding list BAS constant, associative strength from the label to the lure
was a significant predictor of false recall in category lists (r(3) = .814, p < .05) but not DRM lists
(r(3) = .229, p = .36).  Thus, rather than providing support for FTT these findings provide further
evidence for the important role that associative strength plays in the false memory illusion,
regardless of age.  Consistent with the earlier suggestion that labels may increase false memory
because they increase associative activation of the critical lure, and not because they increase gist
extraction rates per se (e.g., Holliday et al., 2008; Odegard et al., 2008), the present findings show
that both list-to-lure and label-to-lure associative strength contribute independently to false
memory illusions.
Interestingly, when descriptive labels were not provided, false recall for DRM and
category lists did not significantly differ and, as suggested by AAT, false recall varied solely as a
function of associative strength.  Overall, then, for all lists associative strength, particularly BAS,
played a key role in determining false memory rates.  Although FAS was also important,
particularly for DRM lists, developmental trends were controlled mainly by BAS.  These results
are consistent with previous findings with children (Howe, 2005, 2006) and tend to favor an
associative activation approach to the development false memory illusions.
Experiment 2
The second experiment was designed to further examine the role of associative strength in
the development of false memories by implementing a different type of manipulation.
Specifically, we varied whether the list contained all items (normal or intact lists), all of the items
except the strongest BAS term (strongest item removed), or all of the items except for several
weaker items, ones that summed to the same BAS value as the strongest item removed (weak
items removed), for both DRM and category lists.  According to AAT, if BAS plays the primary
role in false recall, then regardless of whether a single strong item is removed or several weaker
items are removed that sum to the same BAS value as the strongest one, then there should be no
difference in false memory rates for strong and weak lists but both should have lower false
memory rates than lists with higher associative strength (the intact list).  Although neither FTT
nor AAT makes specific predictions about different rates of spreading activation2, some spreading
activation models suggest that removing stronger items would produce lower activation levels of
the critical lure because there may exist higher rates of spreading activation from a single, strong
item than the summative strength of removing several weaker items.  If so, then removing a
stronger item should have more of an impact on false recall than removing several weaker items
whose individual strengths do not carry as much weight in an associative network (for a more in-
depth analysis of priming effects, see Tse & Neely, 2007).
This manipulation also provides a test of Deese’s (1959) and Underwood’s (1965)
different hypotheses about the importance of associative strength versus the importance of number
of associates creating implicit associative responses (IARs) (also see Robinson & Roediger,
1997).  For Deese (1959), false recall rates are correlated with BAS of the list words to the critical
lure – lists with higher BAS should have higher false recall than lists with lower BAS regardless
of the number of items in the list.  Implicit in Underwood’s (1965) theory, false recall rates
although affected by BAS are also correlated with the number of IARs generated to the
unpresented critical lure.  The more items presented that generate IARs to the critical lure the
more likely it is that the critical lure will be falsely remembered.  Thus, according to Underwood
(1965), lists with more items removed (our weaker items removed conditions) should result in
fewer false recollections than lists with one item removed (our stronger item removed conditions)
despite no overall differences in BAS (assuming that even the weakest item removed would have
produced an IAR).  For Deese (1959), no differences should emerge in false recollection rates
between these two conditions because BAS remains constant.  The only difference that should
appear is between the intact lists and those with reduced BAS.
In previous studies, researchers have examined variations in list length on false
recollection rates, although they have not controlled for levels of BAS.  For example, Robinson
and Roediger (1997) varied the number of items presented from 3 to 15 and found a linear
increase in adults’ false memory rates with list length (ranging from 3% to 30%).  Although they
left the 3 highest BAS items in each list, they did not measure the variation in  BAS
systematically across list length.  Sugrue and Hayne (2006) also varied list length (7 items versus
14 items), leaving the top seven BAS items in each list, but did not systematically vary BAS with
list length.  They found that longer lists increased false recall rates by 127% for adults and 48%
for children (9 and 10-year-olds).
To our knowledge, this is the first experiment to simultaneously vary list length while
keeping BAS constant.  This methodology not only permits a test of the Deese (1959) and
Underwood (1965) hypotheses, but also of AAT’s claim that BAS, not number of items, is critical
to false memory production in children and adults.  As in Experiment 1, we also examined FTT’s
claims about the importance of across-the-list-gist by examining the effects of labels (present
versus absent) and list type (DRM vs. category).  That is, we examined the claim that younger
children should produce more false memories when explicit gist cues were available than when
they were not as well as whether younger children were more likely to produce false recall when
categorized list were presented than when DRM lists were presented.  In order to provide a better
controlled test of this hypothesis in Experiment 2, we equated the associative activation of the
labels to the lure across DRM and category lists.
Method
Participants
            A new sample of 210 children and adults participated (53% male) in this experiment.
There were 47 5-year-olds (M = 5.4, SD = 3 months), 50 7-year-olds (M = 7.4, SD = 4 months),
53 11-year-olds (M = 11.4, SD = 4 months), and 60 18-year-olds (M = 18.6, SD = 8 months).  The
children were White, came from middle-class homes, and were tested following parental consent
and their assent on the testing day.  Adults were tested following signed, informed consent.
Participants were randomly assigned to the label and no label conditions, with half of the
participants per age group (50% male) assigned to each condition.
Design, materials, and procedure
            A 2(List: DRM vs. Category) x 3(Item removed: none vs. strongest vs. weaker) x
4(Age: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11- vs. 18-year-olds) x 2(Labels: No labels vs. Labels) design was used where
list and item removed were manipulated within subject and age and labels were between-subjects
variables.
A different set of 12, 15-item lists (6 DRM lists drawn from Roediger, Watson et al., 2001,
and 6 category lists drawn from van Overschelde et al., 2004; see Appendix B) were presented to
each participant. As in Experiment 1, half of the participants received a label before list
presentation and half received no label.  Unlike in Experiment 1, the associative strength between
the label and the critical lure did not differ significantly between DRM (M = .11) and category
lists (M = .25), t(10) = 1.16, p > .10.  The item(s) removed varied between lists with each
participant being exposed to 4 lists in which nothing was removed (2 DRM and 2 category), 4 lists
in which the strongest BAS item was removed (2 DRM and 2 category), and 4 lists in which the
weakest BAS items were removed (2 DRM and 2 category).  For the latter two types of lists, the
cumulative BAS for each list was held constant such that the BAS associated with the strongest
item removed equaled that of the BAS associated with the weakest items removed (see Appendix
B).  Although list length varied, particularly when weak items were removed (i.e., from a high of
13 presented items to a low of 11 presented items), all lists exceeded 10 items and are above the
threshold necessary to produce false recollections in both children and adults (see Sugrue &
Hayne, 2006).
Mean word frequency did not differ for list items, t(10) = 1.27, p = 0.23, or for critical
lures, t(10) = -1.03, p = 0.33, between DRM and category lists.  In addition, there were no
differences for word frequency for list items, F(2, 35) = 2.70, p = 0.75 between the three
conditions (intact vs. strongest removed vs. weaker removed) (word frequencies were taken from
Stuart et al. (1993-1996)).  Thus, the removal of list items did not affect mean word frequency
values of the lists.
Each list, DRM and category, appeared in every possible condition.  That is, each DRM
and category list appeared as an intact list, as a strongest item removed list, and as a several
weaker items removed list either with or without a label (varied across participants). Because of
these controls, ones that were not possible in Experiment 1 (because lists were constrained by
their associative strength values), we can exclude the possibility of lists effects in Experiment 2.
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room.  Items were read aloud by the
experimenter at a 3-second rate.  Half of the participants in each age group received a descriptive
label prior to hearing each list whereas the other half did not.  Descriptive labels for category lists
consisted of the category name included in the norms (van Overschelde et al., 2004) and for the
DRM lists were constructed to highlight the shared semantic relations across list items and were
drawn from Roediger, Watson et al. (2001) (see Appendix B).  As before, all lists have been used
previously with children and adults in these age ranges (e.g., Brainerd et al., 2002; Howe, 2005,
2006, 2008a; Howe et al., 2008; Roediger, Watson et al., 2001; Seamon et al., 2000), the labels
have been used previously (e.g., Holliday et al., 2008; Howe, 2006), and, as is the norm with
category associate lists, the critical target for category lists was the highest frequency word (most
typical exemplar) for the selected category.  DRM and category lists were selected on the basis of
mean BAS as determined using the University of South Florida norms (Nelson et al., 1999).  Like
Experiment 1, in cases where associative strength was not available, the Edinburgh Associative
Thesaurus was consulted (Kiss et al., 1973).  DRM lists were also selected on the basis of mean
BAS as indicated in the Roediger, Watson et al. (2001) norms.
Prior to the presentation of the first list, participants were given general memory
instructions to listen carefully to the words on the list, as they would be asked to recall the words
later.  Following these instructions, participants in the label condition were given a descriptive
label describing the theme of the list prior to list presentation.  Participants in the no label
condition simply received the word list.  Following list presentation, participants were given a 30-
second distractor task (circling randomized pairs of letters) prior to recall.  Once recall was
complete, the next cycle began.  This procedure was repeated for the remaining 11 lists.  Items
were presented in the usual descending order of BAS.  All presentation and recall was oral and list
order was randomized within each age group.
Results and Discussion
            Preliminary analyses showed that gender was not a source of significant variation and was
eliminated from subsequent analyses.  As before, true recall findings are presented first followed
by false recall.
True Recall
            The proportion of correct responses was analyzed using a 2(List: DRM vs. Category) x
3(Item removed: none vs. strongest vs. weaker) x 4(Age: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11- vs. 18-year-olds) x
2(Labels: No labels vs. Labels) ANOVA.  There was a main effect for list, F(1, 202) = 145.33,
p < .001, (2 = .42, where category lists (M = .40) were better recalled than DRM lists (M = .34),
and a main effect for age, F(3, 202) = 379.08, p < .001, (2 = .85, where post-hoc tests showed that
5-year-olds (M = .17) recalled less than 7-year-olds (M = .27) who recalled less than 11-year-olds
(M = .40) who recalled less than 18-year-olds (M = .64).  These effects were modified by a Age x
List interaction, F(3, 202) = 3.94, p < .01, (2 = .06.  As seen in Table 5, and confirmed by post-hoc
tests, although category lists were recalled better than DRM lists at all ages, the absolute
magnitude of these differences increased with age.  Importantly, there was also an Age x Item
removed interaction, F(6, 404) = 10.45, p < .001, (2 = .13.  As can be seen in the left panel of
Table 6, and confirmed by post-hoc tests, there were no differences in recall as a function of items
removed for 5- and 7-year-olds, whereas 11-year-olds recalled significantly fewer items from the
weak-items-removed list than the strong-item-removed and intact (normal) lists.  This trend
continued for adults who recalled the least from the weak-items-removed lists than the strong-item-
removed lists and the most from intact lists.  Thus, rather than being a list strength effect per se,
amount recalled was positively correlated with list length for both older children and adults.
Finally, there were no effects associated with label.  It would seem that when lists are better
controlled than in the first experiment, the label effect disappears.
False Recall
            The proportion of critical lures falsely recalled was analyzed using a 2(List: DRM vs.
Category) x 3(Item removed: none vs. strongest vs. weaker) x 4(Age: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11- vs. 18-year-
olds) x 2(Labels: No labels vs. Labels) ANOVA.  There were three main effects.  First, there was
a main effect for age, F(3, 202) = 14.79, p < .001, (2 = .18, where post-hoc tests confirmed that
false recall increased significantly across age.  That is, 5-year-olds (M = .17) falsely recalled
fewer critical items than 7-year-olds (M = .25) who recalled fewer false items than 11-year-olds
(M = .33) who recalled fewer false items than adults (M = .40).  Second, there was a main effect
for list, F(1, 202) = 88.31, p < .001, (2 = .30, where there were more false memories for DRM lists
(M = .36) than for category lists (M = .22) a finding more typical in this literature for false recall
and the opposite pattern to that for true recall both for children (Howe, 2006; Howe et al., in
press) and adults (Dewhurst et al., in press).  Finally, there was a main effect for item removed,
F(2, 404) = 144.79, p < .001, (2 = .42, where post-hoc tests confirmed that intact lists (M = .44)
exhibited more false recall than either the strong item removed lists (M = .21) or weak items
removed lists (M = .21), these latter two conditions did not differ.  Importantly, unlike true recall,
the effect for false recall would appear to be strength based rather than length based inasmuch as
removing the same amount of BAS from a list, regardless of whether it was a single strong item or
several weaker ones, halved average false recall rates.  A 50% decline in false recall rates is
consistent with previous research with children and adults (e.g., Sugrue & Hayne, 2006).
However, it should be noted that this 50% decline occurred with only a 24% reduction in BAS.
What this shows is that changes in BAS do not map one-to-one onto changes in false memory
rates, at least not for recall.  In addition, this result shows that when BAS is systematically
controlled and list length is varied, it is activation strength that determines false recall rates in
children and adults not list length.    This finding is consistent with AAT’s predictions as well as
Deese’s (1959) hypothesis concerning the importance of BAS not list-length in determining false
recollection rates.  Importantly, the finding that strong and weak lists exhibit exactly the same
false memory rates excludes the possibility that variation in list length may account for the
findings.  This is inconsistent with the interpretation of Underwood’s (1965) implicit hypothesis
where the number of IARs determines false recollection rates but consistent with the interpretation
that stronger items are more likely to evoke an IAR than weaker items.  Interestingly, as can be
seen in the right panel of Table 6, the difference between intact and changed lists tends to increase
with age.  However, this interaction was not significant.  Finally, unlike the predictions of FTT,
false recall rates were not affected by label, a finding consistent with previous research (e.g.,
Howe, 2006).
Summary and Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2
            The pattern for true recall across both experiments was extremely consistent and showed
that category lists were better recalled than DRM lists.  This is consistent with previous findings
(e.g., Howe 2006; Howe et al., in press).  Differences occurred between experiments in the label
manipulation where Experiment 1 showed increased children’s (but not adults’) true recall when a
label was presented, whereas Experiment 2 did not reveal any differences between label and no
label conditions.
            For false recall, both experiments showed that BAS between list items and the critical lure
is a key determinant for false memory production in children and adults.  However, like true
recall, differences occurred for the label manipulation.  Experiment 1 showed a higher level of
false recall for category lists but not for DRM lists when a label was presented.  In contrast,
Experiment 2 revealed no differences in false memory rates between the label and no label
conditions.  Further analyses showed that this label effect in Experiment 1 was due to the higher
level of associative activation between the label and the critical lure in category than DRM lists.
It seems that when the associative strength between the label and the critical lure is better equated
across DRM and category lists, as it was in Experiment 2, the label effect disappears.
Interestingly, for the no label conditions, the findings of the two experiments differ
slightly in how BAS affects false recall.  That is, in Experiment 1 variation in BAS did not have
as strong an effect on 5-year-old’s false recall as it did on all of the other age groups.  This may be
due to the lower false memory rate for this younger age group in Experiment 1 than Experiment 2.
 That is, both high BAS/high FAS and high BAS/low FAS conditions in Experiment 1 showed
lower false memory rates than intact lists in Experiment 2.  Although false recall rates were
generally higher for all children in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1, they were not significantly
different across experiments (F < 1) and were not attributable to differences in word frequency
across lists (t(22) = 0.79, p = .44) or across critical lures (t(22) = -1.42, p =.17).   However, the
effects of BAS may have been obscured for the youngest children in the first experiment by
possible floor effects, effects that were not present in 5-year-old’s false recall in the second
experiment.
            Despite these modest differences in results across experiments, the overall pattern is very
clear.  As previous research suggests, children are better at remembering category lists than DRM
lists.  False memories are driven by the amount of associative strength between the list items and
the critical lure (BAS).  Providing a descriptive label for the list items overall does not, in and of
itself, increase false memory levels.  Labels only have an effect on false memory production when
they show high levels of association to the critical lure.  Again, this indicates that the level of
association to the critical lure is the significant determent for children’s false memory production.
            Moreover, both experiments demonstrate that true recall is affected more by gist factors
whereas false recall is affected by associative strength.  These outcomes are more consistent with
AAT than FTT particularly inasmuch as gist manipulations (i.e., category vs. DRM lists, gist-
integrating labels vs. no labels) primarily affect true, not false, recall.  Indeed, in some strong
versions of FTT, specific gist manipulations are said to primarily affect false, not true, recall:
“FTT predicts that the effects of the semantic cue instructions should only be found in false recall
of critical lures because true recall of list words is based on verbatim traces” (Holliday et al.,
2008, p. 70).  To the contrary, Experiments 1 and 2 both show that variation in false recall rates
are controlled by associative strength, not gist, manipulations.
Despite the clear pattern of results, one question that arises is whether a direct comparison
between category lists and DRM lists is appropriate since they have different semantic structures.
According to Wu and Barsalou (2007) there are six types of semantic relations that can occur
between words:  antonymy (words of opposite value, e.g., cold and hot), entity (entity-property
relationships between words, e.g., chair and wood), introspective (mental state-property
relationships between words, e.g., happy and sun), situational (words are related to the same
association, e.g., medical treatment), synonymy (words that have the same meaning, e.g., bunny
and rabbit), and taxonomy (words that belong to the same taxonomic category, e.g., cats and dogs
are both animals).  Although it is often difficult to discriminate associative strength and semantic
overlap (see Hutchison, 2003), Brainerd et al. (in press) suggest that DRM lists contain many of
these semantic relations whereas categorical lists contain only taxonomic relations.  The meaning
connections in categorical lists are therefore less varied than in DRM lists.  If so, one could argue
that extracting the overall meaning from word lists is easier when there is a larger variety or
different types of semantic relations available.  Alternatively, and more likely, such lists may lead
to multiple gists, leading to more confusion than when only a single gist is present.  Thus, it may
be easier to extract the overall meaning from lists when only one type of semantic relation (e.g., a
taxonomic relation) is available.  This might be particularly true for children who may have more
difficulty juggling multiple relations in a list.  That is, children may be better with lists containing
a single relation, especially when it comes to extracting the gist of a list.  Because categorized lists
contain only one semantic relation (i.e., taxonomy) they are thematically more consistent than
DRM lists.  For this reason extraction of a separate thematic representation should be easier for
thematically more consistent material (i.e., categorized lists) than for materials that have different
types of relations (i.e., DRM lists).  If extraction of thematic representations (i.e., gist extraction)
of presented material is responsible for false memories as suggested by FTT, then a higher level of
false memories in categorized lists that are thematically more consistent than DRM lists would be
expected.  However, this is not consistent with the present findings.
            Given findings from the current experiments as well as other recent findings (e.g., Howe,
2006; Howe et al., 2008, in press), a reasonable conclusion is that at a minimum, gist-like
manipulations can and do affect children’s true recall and associative strength can and does affect
their false recall.  In Experiments 1 and 2 we manipulated the availability of gist processing by
varying whether participants studied DRM or categorized lists and by explicitly cuing or not cuing
key semantic relationships across list items using labels.  As just discussed, these are powerful
manipulations that have as their locus of effect at true recall.  In fact, across a number of
experiments now it appears as though effects at false recall may be limited to variation primarily
in BAS.  Of course, some might argue that gist manipulations, despite having substantial effects
on true recall, did not affect false recall rates because of lack of power.  However, such arguments
founder given the sheer number of participants for which such effects have been relatively weak
or absent (Ns are now well over 1000) and the number of times these effects have failed to appear
in false recall relative to their general robustness in true recall.  More importantly, these
arguments founder because when these effects do emerge, they are consistent with AAT’s
prediction that categorized lists and theme-relevant labels can and do affect false recall rates, but
only when they contribute to the overall associative activation of the critical lure.
Of course, it is prudent to test assumptions using a variety of operationalizations of key
constructs.  Indeed, any one manipulation by itself has potential limitations and, testing gist-based
versus associative-activation explanations by only manipulating explicit variables such as list
content and cuing has its own set of concerns (e.g., differential sensitivities of measuring
recollection with recall versus recognition, presenting cues only at encoding versus at encoding
and retrieval), ones that may limit the degree to which findings can be generalized.  To correct this
situation, we conducted a third experiment, one that examined a different, more implicit test of
gist versus associative activation.
Experiment 3
In Experiments 1 and 2 it has been established that children’s false memories are
dependent on associative activation processes indexed by BAS and that this is independent of gist
manipulations.  In Experiment 3, we take a different tactic and examine what might be considered
a more implicit operationalization of gist-across-the-list, one that has to do with the semantic
coherence of the studied material, namely, semantic density (SD).  SD is an index of associations
among list items themselves rather than between the list items and the critical lure.  Specifically, if
the thematic cohesion of a list is related to a child’s ability to access the list’s gist, then lists whose
cohesion index (semantic density) is high should evince higher levels of false recollection
(particularly recall measures as they clearly involve gist recollective processes; see Brainerd &
Reyna, 2005) than lists whose cohesion index is low (also see discussion in Gallo, 2006).  Indeed,
according to FTT, there should be an interaction between age and semantic cohesion/density such
that semantic density effects should be larger with younger than older children given younger
children’s poorer spontaneous gist extraction abilities.  Because adults’ ability to extract gist
regardless of cohesion is not contested in the literature, in Experiment 3 we concern ourselves
solely with children.
            Before turning to the experiment itself, it is worth noting that we are not aware of any
existing research that has varied semantic cohesion/density with children.  As close as we could
find were studies in which thematic blocking of list materials was manipulated in DRM studies
with adults (e.g., McDermott, 1996), resulting in increases in both true and false recall rates;
blocking manipulations that have been used to examine children’s true recall of categorized
materials (e.g., see Lange, 1978), resulting in increases in correct recall (false recall was not
examined); and several studies manipulating semantic density with adults that examined the role
of episodic context in true recall (e.g., McEvoy et al., 1999; Nelson & Zhang, 2000; Nelson,
Goodmon, & Akirmak, 2007).  For example, McEvoy et al. (1999) found that when BAS was
held constant, high levels of semantic density (as measured by the number of inter-item
connections) elevated true recall and low levels of semantic density decreased true recall.  The
reverse was found for false recall: low levels increased false recall whereas high levels of
semantic density decreased false recall.  It has been suggested that because high levels of semantic
density increased true recall, false memories are less likely to occur.  Furthermore, exactly the
opposite pattern was found for false recognition.  That is, high levels of semantic density
increased false recognition.  McEvoy et al. (1999) suggest that the high level of semantic density
increased the familiarity of the critical lure on the recognition test and therefore false recognition.
The latter finding could also be explained by FTT.  However, because of the lower amount of
false recollection that occurred for the same lures in the recall paradigm in the low-level semantic
density condition, it seems unlikely that a pure gist-based explanation would suffice.  Overall, the
studies to date support the conclusion that both BAS and semantic density are more consistent
with models emphasizing associative activation.
In the present experiment, we manipulated semantic cohesion/density by varying the
degree to which items on the list were associated with one another.  Items on DRM and category
lists not only vary in the number of connections among items within the list (the metric used by
McEvoy et al., 1999) but also in the degree to which they are interconnected (a metric akin to
BAS).  That is, in addition to measuring the degree to which items on a list give rise to a critical
lure (as measured by BAS), one can measure the degree to which the list items themselves are
linked to one another (semantic density or SD).  Indeed, categorized lists that are semantically
denser give rise to higher rates of true recall than lists whose members are not as highly
interconnected (e.g., see Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004).
In Experiment 3, we operationalized SD using Nelson et al.’s (1999) norms for associative
connectivity.  Essentially, SD is a composite measure of the degree to which items within a list
activate each other (both FAS and BAS between list items).  Both SD and BAS are based on
associative strength but the difference is that the latter is based on direct association between list
items (e.g., bed) and the critical lure (e.g., SLEEP) whereas the former is based on associations
within a list and these can be forward and backward (e.g., bed to rest and rest to bed).  Because
both BAS and SD are based on the same associative strength metric, direct comparisons can be
made between the individual components’ contributions to true and false recall.  Research has
shown that the higher a list’s SD, the better recall is for materials on that list, partly because a
remembered item is more likely to cue other, related items on a list (see McEvoy et al., 1999;
Nelson et al., 2007; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004).  Under conditions such as these, most, if not all,
memory models (including AAT and FTT) accurately predict that true recall should increase as
SD increases.  Theories differ, however, in whether SD should also affect false recall.  Theories
such as FTT predict that to the extent that higher levels of SD are correlated with a greater
likelihood of extracting list gist, false recall rates should also increase (and as noted earlier, this
may interact with age).  However, for theories based on associative activation (AAT), variation in
SD, while affecting true recall, should have smaller or null effects on false recall, depending on
how much SD contributes to item-specific distinctiveness (McEvoy et al., 1999).  Moreover,
according to AAT, the critical variable determining false recall of critical lures is BAS, not across-
the-list connectivity.
In Experiment 3, then, we varied both BAS as well as SD.  For half of the lists, BAS was
higher than SD (higher BAS) and for the other half of the lists, SD was higher than BAS (higher
SD)3.  Both FTT and AAT predict that true recall rates should be higher for lists high on SD (i.e.,
true recall should be higher for higher SD lists than higher BAS lists).  However, the theories
differ for false recollection.  According to FTT, lists higher in SD should also exhibit greater false
recall than those lower in SD [i.e., (higher SD) > (higher BAS)] and these effects should be
stronger for younger than older children.  According to AAT, because SD is not related to false
recall but BAS is, SD should have no effect but lists higher in BAS should produce higher levels
of false recall than those with lower levels of BAS [i.e., (higher BAS) > (higher SD)].
Method
Participants
A new sample of 77 children participated (50% male) in this experiment.   There were 25
5-year-olds (M = 5.3, SD = 4 months), 25 7-year-olds (M = 7.4, SD = 4 months), and 27 11-year-
olds (M = 11.3, SD = 4 months).  The children were White, came from middle-class homes, and
were tested following parental consent and their own assent on the testing day.
Design, materials, and procedure
A 2(List condition: higher SD vs. higher BAS) x 3(Age: 5- vs. 7- vs. 11-year-olds) design
was used where list condition was manipulated within subject and age was a between-subjects
variable.  Each child received 6, 11-item word lists (see Appendix C).  The norms for BAS and
SD were obtained from the n x n matrix in Nelson et al. (1999).   As before, BAS values represent
the associations between each list item (e.g., yellow) and the critical lure (e.g., GREEN).  SD
values represent associations between the list items within a list and were calculated following
Nelson and Zhang (2000).  For example, in the GREEN list the item yellow produces the list item
blue with a probability of .07, the list item blue produces the list item red with a probability of
.11, red produces yellow with a probability of .02, and so forth.  SD comprises the sum of all inter-
item associations.  Out of the 6 word lists, 3 lists were lower in BAS than in SD (SD > BAS:
Mean difference = 1.48) and 3 lists were higher in BAS than in SD (BAS > SD: Mean difference
= 1.47).   There were no significant differences in the mean differences between these list
conditions.  Moreover, activation strength (see Footnote 3) did not differ across list conditions
(t(4) = 1.40, p = 0.24).  Similarly, there were no significant differences in mean word frequency
for list items, t(4) = 0.42, p = 0.70, or in word frequencies of the critical lures between the two list
conditions, t(4) = - 0.71, p = 0.52 (word frequencies were taken from Stuart et al. (1993-1996)).
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room.  Prior to presentation of the first list,
children were given standard memory instructions indicating that they would be presented with
lists of words and that they should try to remember as many as possible.  Following these
instructions, participants were presented the first list, administered a 30-second distractor task
(circling randomized pairs of letters), and then asked to recall as many words as possible from the
list.  This study-distractor-test cycle was continued until all six lists had been presented.  Items
were presented in the usual descending order of BAS.  Items were audio recorded and presented to
the children at a 3-second rate and list order was counterbalanced across children.
Results and Discussion
            Preliminary analyses showed that gender was not a significant source of variation and was
eliminated from subsequent analyses.  Like Experiments 1 and 2, true recall findings are presented
first followed by false recall.
True Recall
The proportion of correct responses was analyzed using a 2(List condition: higher SD vs.
higher BAS) x 3(Age: 5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds) ANOVA.  There was a main effect for age, F(2,
74) = 111.39, p < .001, (² = .75.  Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons (all ps < .001) showed that 11-
year-olds (M = .54) correctly recalled more than 7-year-olds (M = .33) who correctly recalled
more than 5-year-olds (M = .20).  There was also a main effect for list condition, F(1, 74) = 58.11,
p < .001, (² = .44, where more items were correctly recalled when semantic density was high
(higher SD; M = .40) than when it was low (higher BAS; M = .31).  As can be seen in the left
panel of Table 7, the Age x List condition interaction was not significant (i.e., semantic density
effects were similar at each age).
False Recall
The proportion of critical lures falsely recalled was analyzed using a 2(List condition:
higher SD vs. higher BAS) x 3(Age: 5-, 7-, and 11-year-olds) ANOVA.  There was a main effect
for age, F(2, 74) = 5.50, p < .01, (² = .13. Post-hoc Bonferroni comparisons (ps < .02) showed that
5-year-olds (M  = .04) falsely recalled fewer critical lures than 7-year-olds (M = .13) and than 11-
year-olds (M  = .14) and the latter two age groups did not differ.  There was also a main effect for
list condition, F(1, 74) = 8.10, p < .02, (² = .10, where more critical lures were falsely recalled
when BAS was high (higher BAS; M = .14) than when it was low (higher SD; M =.06).  As can be
seen in the right panel of Table 7, the Age x List condition interaction was not significant (i.e.,
BAS effects were similar at each age).
Overall, then, consistent with predictions of most theories (including AAT and FTT),
semantic density (a measure of within-list cohesion) increased true recall rates for all children
regardless of age.  Like children’s categorized recall, higher levels of intra-list similarity produced
higher rates of true recall.  However, as predicted by AAT, these semantic density effects did not
translate into higher rates of false recall.  As seen in previous studies with children (e.g., Howe et
al., 2004, 2008, in press), what controls false memory rates is BAS – when BAS is high, false
recall of critical lures is high; when BAS is low, false recall of critical lures is low.  Similar effects
were obtained here – when BAS was high, false recall of critical lures was high; when BAS was
low, false recall of critical lures was low.  Thus, like the findings when across-the-list gist was
explicitly cued (Experiments 1 and 2), when across-the-list gist was manipulated implicitly (as
measured by SD), true recall is the beneficiary, consistent with most theories of memory and
memory development.  However, these effects do not translate into changes in false recall rates.
Rather, false recall rates in all three experiments reported here are controlled by BAS, consistent
with AAT.
General Discussion and Conclusions
That both true and false recall increased with age is consistent with previous
developmental research and both FTT and AAT.  However, across experiments, the pattern of
findings was more consistent with the AAT’s predictions of developmental patterns in false
memory illusions than FTT’s.  Moreover, the results provided clear evidence of developmental
continuity in the emergence of false memory illusions, consistent with what is known about the
development of accurate remembering.  In the remainder of this article, we discuss both of these
trends, separately.
Associative-activation and fuzzy-trace theories of false memory development.
            The results of these experiments are more consistent with AAT (see Howe, 2005, 2006,
2008a, 2008b; Howe et al., 2008, in press) than with FTT (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2005; Brainerd
et al., 2008).  Specifically, regardless of age, false recall rates were contingent solely on variation
in associative strength and not on manipulations related to gist-across-the-list.  Indeed, regardless
of age, more false recall was evidenced when lists were high in associative strength, particularly
BAS (Experiments 1, 2, and 3).  Although FAS (Experiment 1) did play a role in false recall rates
(as shown previously by Brainerd & Wright, 2005, with adults using recognition measures),
particularly when explicit category primes were given prior to list presentation in the first
experiment, overall list strength was the single best predictor of false recall rates.  Neither the use
of categorized lists nor the provision of explicit cues that primed the lists’ gist increased false
memory rates (Experiments 1 and 2) except, as noted, when those primes were highly associated
with the critical lure and not because they primed gist-across-the-list.  Moreover, when the degree
of semantic cohesion among list constituents was increased, true recall was enhanced but false
recall levels did not change (Experiment 3).
            That associative activation, especially as indexed by BAS, plays a major role in false
memory production is not new in the adult literature (e.g., Gallo, 2006).  With the current
experiments as well as other recent research with children (Howe, 2005, 2006, 2008a; Howe et al.,
2008, in press), it is becoming equally apparent in the developmental literature that associative
activation is the key variable driving children’s false memories too.  Moreover, it is also
becoming clear that some of the best-fitting models for adult false memory production are ones
based on associative activation (e.g., Gallo, 2006; Hutchison & Balota, 2005; Kimball et al.,
2007).  What the current experiments and other recent findings in the developmental literature
suggest is that associative-activation theory may also provide an appropriate model for the
development of false memories (e.g., Howe, 2005; Howe et al., 2008; Metzger et al., 2008).  In
the rest of this section, we focus on the findings relevant to this claim.
            First, consider the manipulation of categorical versus associative lists across the
Experiments 1 and 2.  FTT predicted that the additional vertical, or gist-across-the-list,
connections available across categorized lists should enhance false recollection rates, particularly
in younger children as they are less likely to spontaneously notice and utilize such relations than
adults.  In addition, it could be that category lists should exceed DRM lists in false recall rates
particularly for young children because they contain fewer potential gists (the category itself) than
DRM lists that can contain multiple gists.  By contrast, AAT predicted that associative activation
(BAS) is the critical determinant for false memories independent of list type (categorical vs.
associative).  In particular, these additional relations in categorical lists, while enhancing true
recall, should not have an impact on false recall unless they too contributed to the overall
associative activation of the critical lure.  Like prior research (Howe, 2006; Howe et al., in press),
it is this latter outcome that was obtained in the first two experiments in this article.  Specifically,
considering only those comparisons between category and DRM lists without the addition of
explicit gist-priming cues, false recall rates were no greater for category lists than DRM lists.
Rather, across Experiments 1 and 2, false recall rates were determined by overall associative
activation (BAS and FAS).
            Second, consider the effects of explicit priming (cuing) using theme-relevant labels.  FTT
predicted that such cues should increase false memory rates because they prime across-the-list gist
(e.g., Holliday et al., 2008) and that these effects should be larger in younger children than older
children and adults because it is the younger children who are particularly deficient in
spontaneous gist processing.  By contrast, AAT makes the same prediction here as it did with the
category-structure manipulation, namely, that false recall rates should not be altered by explicit
cues unless they alter the overall associative activation of the critical lure.  Again, the results of
the first two experiments in this article are consistent with AAT.  In Experiment 1, false recall for
categorized lists was higher when explicit cues were presented, but the same was not true for
DRM lists.  As it turned out, this increase was an artifact of increased associative activation not
priming of gist-across-the-list.  That is, increased false recall was a consequence of the category
labels being more highly associated with the critical lure (the category prototype) on the category
lists than the labels used for the DRM lists.  When these associative activation differences
between the cues were eliminated in Experiment 2, there were no effects due to explicitly cuing
the gist for category or DRM lists.
            When a more implicit measure of gist-across-the-list was employed in Experiment 3
(semantic cohesion or density), and it was contrasted with variation in BAS, we once again
obtained findings that were more consistent with AAT than FTT.  That is, increases in interitem
cohesion were associated with increases in true recall but not false recall.  The only variable
(besides age) that influenced children’s rates of false recall was changes in associative activation
levels (as indexed by BAS).
            Taken together, the predictions of FTT (more false recall for children when gist relations
were present [category lists], when gist was primed [cues], and when interitem semantic cohesion
was high [semantically dense lists]) were not confirmed in any of the three experiments in this
article.  Instead, what was found across all of the experiments was that manipulations designed to
increase the probability of gist extraction led to increases in true recollection but had no effect on
false recollection.  Indeed, across all three experiments and regardless of which gist-enhancing
manipulation was examined, associative activation was the single best determinant of false
memory rates regardless of age.
Overall, then, because true and false recall, but especially false recollection in children and
adults, depended on the strength of associative relations, the current findings are consistent with
more general associative-activation models of memory illusions using the DRM paradigm (e.g.,
Gallo, 2006; Kimball et al., 2007).   Indeed, this conclusion fits well with other recent findings
concerning children’s susceptibility to the DRM illusion (e.g., Howe, 2005, 2006, 2008a, 2008b;
Howe et al., 2008, in press).  More important, it is consistent with speculation on the mechanisms
underlying adults’ DRM illusions (Gallo, 2006; Hutchison & Balota, 2005; Roediger, Watson et
al., 2001).  For example Roediger and colleagues (Roediger, Watson et al., 2001) found for adults
that BAS was the critical factor predicting false memories when examining other variables (e.g.,
word length, word frequency, concreteness, FAS, connectivity, and true recall).  This is exactly
the pattern that has been obtained across the three experiments here.  When controlling for FAS
(Experiment 1), word frequency (Experiments 1, 2, and 3), and connectivity (SD) (Experiment 3),
BAS was the key factor driving false memories, regardless of age.  Most importantly, the role of
BAS in the false memory illusion was prevalent despite using different methods and experimental
manipulations.  Again, although BAS may serve as a proxy variable for a host of different type of
relationships (phonological, orthographic, temporal contiguity, spatial proximity, superordinate
relations, property relations, physical or conceptual similarity, etc.), and it may be difficult to
isolate associative activation from semantic overlap (Brainerd et al., in press; Hutchison, 2003;
Roediger, Watson et al., 2001), it is still the single best predictor of children’s and adults’ false
memory illusions.  We now consider this developmental continuity in more detail.
Developmental continuity in false memory illusions.
One of the novel findings to emerge from these experiments is that age-related increases in
true and false recall were observed regardless of the list’s associative strength.  That is, both
strong and weak lists showed similar developmental trends.  Moreover, both BAS (Experiments 1,
2, and 3) and FAS (Experiment 1) played a key role in children’s and adults’ false memory rates.
Although BAS was clearly the main determinant of false memory rates for children and adults,
FAS also contributed.  This is consistent with Brainerd and Wright’s (2005) findings for adults
using considerably shorter lists and a recognition procedure.  The novel contribution of the current
research is that the results extend this trend to measures of recall and, more importantly, to
children’s false memory development.  In doing so, these findings add to the growing literature on
memory continuity effects across age (Howe, 2000; Howe et al., 2008, in press).
In fact, the current findings add to a growing list of memory phenomena that exhibit strong
developmental invariance.  Evidence has been accumulating for some time that many of the
variables that govern encoding, consolidation, storage, retention, and retrieval processes in young
children (and even infants) are the same as those that regulate these memory processes in older
children and adults (for reviews, see Bauer, 2004; Howe, 2000).  Of course, these continuities
notwithstanding, there do exist significant developmental advances in memory processes across
childhood and into adulthood (e.g., faster and more efficient encoding, storage, and retrieval;
increased retention of information over longer intervals) that are contingent on advances in related
cognitive domains (e.g., knowledge base, attentional resources, strategies) (for reviews, see Bauer,
2005; Howe, 2000).  What the current experiments add to this ever-expanding list is that the
development of both veridical and false memory can be viewed as developmentally invariant
phenomena and that the development of false memory in childhood can be subsumed under the
same model as that used to account for false recollection in adulthood.  That is, these age-
invariant effects suggest that a single theory should be able to account for false memory and its
development, one that relies on associative-activation processes.
The model supported by the current experiments, as well as a number of prior studies
(Howe, 2005, 2006, 2008a; Howe et al., 2008, in press), is AAT.  Here, developmental changes in
veridical recall and false memory illusions are driven by increases in the number and strength of
associative relations in children’s knowledge base (Bjorklund, 1987; 2004) as well as the speed
and automaticity with which these associative relations are activated (Bjorklund & Jacobs, 1985;
Howe, 2005; Metzger et al., 2008).  These changes in number, strength, speed, and automaticity
of associations and their activation are linked to other well-known changes in children’s
knowledge base, resources, and speed of processing in related cognitive domains (for reviews, see
Bjorklund, 2004; Courage & Howe, 2002; Dempster & Brainerd, 1995).  Together, these
developmental changes lead to increased activation of studied and nonstudied but related
information in memory, which in turn increases both true and false recall rates across childhood
and into adulthood.  Because the associative-activation theory provides a necessary and sufficient
account of true and false memory data from both children and adults, and because the
developmental mechanisms identified in this theory are well-known across a variety of other,
developmentally continuous phenomena in memory and cognition, it may be more parsimonious
to adopt this theory of false memory development than to alter other extant models.
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Appendix A
DRM and Category Lists Used in Experiment 1
I.  DRM Word Lists and Labels
(i) High BAS – Low FAS
Critical Lure: Smell
Label: Something to do with your senses
MBAS: .290 MFAS: .015
ITEM  BAS    FAS
Nose    .108     .116
Breathe            .000     .000
Sniff    .442     .043
Aroma .678     .000
Hear     .000     .000
See       .000     .000
Nostril .000     .000
Whiff   .577     .000
Scent    .625     .029
Reek    .510     .000
Stench  .562     .000
Fragrance         .389     .000
Perfume           .393     .036
Salts     .028     .000
---------------------------------------------------------
Critical Lure: Mountain
Label: Things to do with high places
MBAS: .163 MFAS: .037
ITEM  BAS    FAS
Hill      .428     .265
Valley  .195     .020
Climb  .291     .092
Summit            .108     .000
Top      .000     .041
Molehill           .256     .031
Peak     .248     .020
Plain    .000     .000
Glacier .020     .000
Goat     .028     .000
Bike     .033     .000
Climber           .603     .031
Range  .000     .051
Steep    .061     .000
(ii) High BAS – High FAS
Critical Lure: Needle
Label: Something to do with spiky objects
MBAS: .203 MFAS: .063
ITEM  BAS    FAS
Thread .760     .420
Pin       .290     .210
Eye      .000     .000
Sewing            .181     .240
Sharp   .030     .020
Point    .020     .020
Prick    .110     .010
Thimble           .220     .000
Haystack          .420     .030
Thorn   .030     .000
Hurt     .000     .000
Injection          .330     .000
Syringe            .520     .000
Cloth    .000     .000
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Critical Lure: Doctor
Label: Medical things
MBAS: .245 MFAS: .053
ITEM  BAS    FAS
Nurse   .550     .380
Sick     .030     .050
Lawyer            .150     .100
Medicine         .150     .070
Health  .050     .020
Hospital           .030     .010
Dentist .210     .020
Physician         .800     .040
Ill         .000     .010
Patient .370     .030
Office  .010     .010
Stethoscope     .520     .000
Surgeon           .480     .040
Clinic   .300     .000
(iii) Low BAS – High FAS
Critical Lure: Lamp
Label: Things that help you see
MBAS: .006 MFAS: .066
ITEM              BAS    FAS
Light    .020     .769
Shade   .028     .058
Bulb     .014     .045
Post      .000     .026
Black   .000     .000
Cord    .000     .000
Desk    .034     .019
Bright  .000     .000
Lighter .000     .000
Read    .000     .000
On        .000     .000
Burn    .000     .013
Pole                         .000                    .000
Stand                       .000                    .000
-------------------------------------------------------------
Critical Lure: Cabbage
Label: Something that you eat
MBAS: .012 MFAS: .051
ITEM              BAS                  FAS
Head    .000     .022
Lettuce .021     .281
Vegetable        .000     .137
Food    .000     .022
Salad    .000     .022
Green   .000     .079
Garden .000     .000
Leaf     .000     .029
Sauerkraut       .042     .000
Slaw    .041     .043
Patch    .066     .115
Plant    .000     .000
Carrots .000     .000
Soup    .000     .014
II.  Category Word Lists and Labels
(i) High BAS – Low FAS
Critical Lure: Apple
Label: Fruit
MBAS: .051 MFAS: .018
ITEM  BAS    FAS
Orange .080     .170
Banana .150     .020
Grape   .030     .000
Pear     .250     .050
Peach   .060     .030
Strawberry       .000     .000
Kiwi    .000     .000
Pineapple         .000     .000
Watermelon     .000     .000
Tomato            .010     .000
Plum    .050     .000
Grapefruit        .010     .000
Mango .000     .000
Cherry .080     .000
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Critical Lure: Car
Label: Transportation vehicle
MBAS: .117 MFAS: .020
ITEM  BAS    FAS
Bus      .250     .020
Truck   .260     .110
Airplane           .030     .010
Train    .060     .010
Bicycle            .040     .080
Van      .450     .000
Boat     .000     .060
Motorcycle      .090     .000
Skateboard       .000     .000
Subway            .030     .000
Taxi     .130     .000
Scooter            .000     .000
Jeep     .300     .010
Helicopter        .000     .000
(ii) High BAS – High FAS
Critical Lure: Instrument
Label: Musical things
MBAS: .125 MFAS: .039
ITEM  BAS    FAS
Drums  .010     .050
Guitar  .050     .150
Flute    .180     .080
Piano   .040     .160
Trumpet           .180     .070
Clarinet            .120     .030
Saxophone       .240     .020
Violin  .060     .020
Trombone        .170     .000
Tuba    .250     .010
Cello    .150     .000
Oboe    .180     .000
Bass     .030     .000
Harp     .080     .000
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Critical Lure: Chair
Label: Pieces of Furniture
MBAS: .169 MFAS: .037
ITEM  BAS    FAS
Table   .760     .310
Couch  .290     .110
Bed      .000     .010
Desk    .290     .020
Sofa     .130     .080
Dresser            .000     .000
Loveseat          .000     .000
Nightstand       .000     .000
Ottoman          .000     .000
Recliner           .550     .000
Stool    .320     .030
Futon   .000     .000
Bookshelf        .000     .000
Cabinet                          .020                 .000
(iii) Low BAS – High FAS
Critical Lure: Hammer
Label: Carpenter’s tools
MBAS: .089 MFAS: .056
ITEM  BAS    FAS
Nail      .620     .800
Saw      .100     .030
Screwdriver     .080     .000
Drill     .000     .000
Wrench            .090     .000
Screw(s)          .030     .000
Level   .000     .000
Ruler    .000     .000
Tape Measure  .000     .000
Wood   .000     .000
Sander .000     .000
Knife   .000     .000
Chisel  .410     .050
Pencil  .000     .000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Critical Lure: Fly
Label: Insect
MBAS: .047 MFAS: .021
ITEM  BAS    FAS
Ant      .000     .000
Spider  .190     .020
Bee      .010     .010
Mosquito         .050     .040
Beetle  .000     .000
Ladybug          .000     .000
Grasshopper    .010     .000
Butterfly          .000     .010
Wasp   .020     .000
Roach  .000     .010
Moth    .110     .000
Gnat     .230     .000
Cockroach       .000     .000
Caterpillar       .030     .000
Appendix B
DRM and Category Lists Used in Experiment 2
DRM Lists and Their Backward Associative Strength
Items Removed                  List and Label                                                 CBAS                   RBAS
                             MAN: Things to do with people
None                woman, husband, uncle, lady, mouse, male, father, strong,      1.72                     N/A
friend, beard, person, handsome, muscle, suit, old
Strong              husband, uncle, lady, mouse, male, father, strong, friend,     1.12                 .60
beard, person, handsome, muscle, suit, old
Weak               woman, husband, uncle, mouse, strong, friend, person,         1.12                 .60
handsome, muscle, suit, old                                                       (.37,.13,.05,.05)
                        COLD: Things to do with temperature
None                hot, snow, warm, winter, ice, wet, frigid, chilly, heat,                             5.30                      N/A
weather, freeze, air, shiver, arctic, frost
Strong              snow, warm, winter, ice, wet, frigid, chilly, heat, weather,   4.62                 .68
            freeze, air, shiver, arctic, frost
Weak               hot, snow, warm, winter, ice, chilly, heat, weather, freeze,   4.62                 .68
air, shiver, arctic, frost                                                                                  (.11,.57)
                        DOCTOR: Medical things
None                nurse, sick, lawyer, medicine, health, hospital, dentist, 3.68                      N/A
physician, ill, patient, office, stethoscope, surgeon, clinic,
cure
Strong              nurse, sick, lawyer, medicine, health, hospital, dentist,         2.88                 .80
            ill, patient, office, stethoscope, surgeon, clinic, cure
Weak               nurse, sick, lawyer, medicine, physician, ill, patient, office,  2.88                 .80
                        surgeon, clinic, cure                                                                    (.05,.52,.03,.21)
                        SHIRT: Things you wear
None                blouse, sleeves, pants, tie, button, shorts, iron, polo, collar,      2.89                     N/A
                        vest, pocket, jersey, belt, linen, cuffs
Strong              sleeves, pants, tie, button, shorts, iron, polo, collar, vest,      2.24                 .65
                        pocket, jersey, belt, linen, cuffs
Weak               blouse, sleeves, pants, button, shorts, iron, vest, jersey,         2.24                 .65
                        belt, linen, cuffs
(.34,.18,.07,.06)
                        SLEEP: Things you do lying down
None                bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket, doze,         6.47                     N/A
                        slumber, snore, nap, peace, yawn, dozy
Strong              bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket,          doze,    5.74
.73
                        slumber, snore, peace, yawn, dozy
Weak               bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, snooze, doze, slumber,           nap,     5.74
.73
                        peace, yawn, dozy                                                                            (.02,.44,.28)
                        LION: Animal things
None                tiger, circus, jungle, tamer, den, cub, Africa, mane, cage,        2.02                      N/A
feline, roar, fierce, bears, hunt, pride
Strong              tiger, circus, jungle, tamer, den, cub, Africa, mane, cage,     1.41                 .61
feline, fierce, bears, hunt, pride
Weak               circus, jungle, tamer, den, cub, Africa, cage, feline, roar,      1.41                 .61
                        bears, hunt, pride
(.11,.20,.31)
Category Lists and Their Backward Associative Strength
Items Removed                  List and Label                                                 CBAS                   RBAS
                             ROBIN: Birds
None                Eagle, bluejay, cardinal, hawk, crow, hummingbird, parrot,              7.27                      N/A
                        sparrow, pigeon, seagull, dove, duck, falcon, canary, owl
Strong              Eagle, bluejay, cardinal, hawk, crow, hummingbird, parrot,             6.52
.75
                        pigeon, seagull, dove, duck, falcon, canary, owl
Weak               Eagle, bluejay, hawk, crow, hummingbird, parrot, sparrow,             6.52
.75
                        pigeon, seagull, dove, falcon, canary                                               (.47,.10,.18)
                        APPLE: Fruits
None                Orange, banana, grape, pear, peach, strawberry, kiwi,          .73                       N/A
                        pineapple, watermelon, tomato, plum, grapefruit, mango,
                        cherry, lemon
Strong              Orange, banana, grape, peach, strawberry, kiwi, pineapple,  .48                   .25
                        watermelon, tomato, plum, grapefruit, mango, cherry, lemon
Weak               Orange, pear, peach, strawberry, kiwi, pineapple,                 .49                   .24
                        watermelon, grapefruit, mango, cherry, lemon
(.15,.05,.03,.01)
                        INSTRUMENT: Musical things
None                Drums, guitar, flute, piano, trumpet, clarinet, saxophone,  1.79                      N/A
                        violin, trombone, tuba, bass guitar, cello, oboe, bass, viola
Strong              Drums, guitar, flute, piano, trumpet, clarinet, saxophone,     1.54                 .25
                        violin, trombone, bass guitar, cello, oboe, bass, viola
Weak               Drums, guitar, flute, trumpet, clarinet, saxophone, violin,     1.54                 .25
                        trombone, tuba, bass guitar, cello, viola
(.04,.03,.18)
                        FLY: Insects
None                Ant, spider, bee, mosquito, beetle, ladybug, grasshopper,     .71                        N/A
                        butterfly, wasp, roach, moth, gnat, cockroach, caterpillar, bug
Strong              Ant, spider, bee, mosquito, beetle, ladybug, grasshopper,     .48                   .23
                        butterfly, wasp, roach, moth, cockroach, caterpillar, bug
Weak               Ant, mosquito, beetle, ladybug, butterfly, roach, moth, gnat,            .48
.23
                        cockroach, caterpillar, bug
(.19,.01,.02,.01)
                        HAMMER: Carpenter’s tools
None                Nail, saw, screwdriver, drill, wrench, screw, level, ruler         1.33                      N/A
                        tape measure, wood, sander, knife, chisel, pencil, sandpaper
Strong              Saw, screwdriver, drill, wrench, screw, level, ruler,              .71                   .62
                        tape measure, wood, sander, knife, chisel, pencil, sandpaper
Weak               Nail, drill, wrench, level, ruler, tape measure, wood, sander,            .71
.62
                        knife, pencil, sandpaper
(.41,.10,.08,.03)
                        CAR: Transportation Vehicles
None                Bus, truck, airplane, train, bicycle, van, boat, motorcycle,           2.00                      N/A
                        Ford, skateboard, subway, taxi, scooter, helicopter, jeep
Strong              Bus, truck, airplane, train, bicycle, boat, motorcycle, Ford,  1.55                 .45
                        skateboard, subway, taxi, scooter, helicopter, jeep
Weak               Bus, truck, airplane, train, bicycle, van, boat, skateboard,     1.55                 .45
                        subway, taxi, scooter, helicopter, jeep
(.36,.09)
Note.      CBAS: cumulative backward associative strength; RBAS: removed backward associative strength; italicized
items were removed in strong lists; bolded items were removed in weak lists.
Appendix C
Semantic Density Dominant Lists
Critical Lure: Green             Critical Lure: Crime                        Critical Lure: Number
Grass               .36                   Punishment     .17                   Math                .18
Yellow             .18                   Criminal         .08                   Nine                 .14
Bean                .15                   Murder                        .05                   Ten                  .12
Blue                 .14                   Robbery          .04                   Three               .10
Vegetables       .10                   Steal                .04                   Two                .07
Nature              .05                   Prison             .02                   One                  .05
Tree                 .05                   Justice             .02                   Phone              .05
Colour             .04                   Jail                   .02                   Five                 .05
Leaf                 .04                   Bad                  .01                   Eight               .03
Apple               .03                   Thief               .01                   Address           .02
Red                  .02                   Burglar            .01                   Letter              .02
BAS = 2.16; SD = 3.17           BAS = 1.47; SD = 3.20          BAS = 1.83; SD = 3.52
Backward Associative Strength Dominant Lists
Critical Lure: Soft                 Critical Lure: Hair               Critical Lure: Work
Hard                 .56                   Brush              .44                   Labor              .69
Pillow              .24                   Lice                 .37                   Job                  .57
Gentle              .20                   Comb              .31                   Earn                 .20
Smooth            .18                   Shampoo         .29                   School             .13
Cotton              .17                   Dryer              .20                   Office              .13
Skin                 .16                   Head                .19                   Sweat              .11
Silk                  .09                   Blonde                        .16                   Play                 .07
Touch              .06                   Style                .11                   Money             .03
Feather             .05                   Brown             .06                   Fun                 .02
Warm               .05                   Cut                  .06                   Hard                .01
Comfortable    .02                   Hat                   .06                   Lazy                .01
BAS = 2.78; SD = 1.15           BAS = 3.25; SD = 1.91          BAS = 2.97; SD = 1.53
Note: BAS = backward associative strength; SD = semantic density; the number associative with
each word is that word’s backward associative strength to the critical lure.  Activation strength
(AS) = BAS + SD.
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Footnotes
1Although total backward associative strength is often preferred over mean backward associative
strength, we used mean strength in order to provide a correspondence to the metric preferred for
variation in forward associative strength.  Because in our case mean and total backward
associative strength were correlated, using the mean as the metric for backward associative
strength did not serve to compromise the findings.
2Spreading activation models (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Loftus,
1975) assume that presented items activate their memory representations and this activation
spreads to other words via links throughout an associative network.  Because list items are
associated with the unpresented critical lure, this lure is activated numerous times (11 to 15 times
in our experiments, depending on the list being studied) and is later falsely included in the recall
set.  Current models of false memory production in children and adults, while still relying on
associative connectivity, contain more complicated, multiplicative encoding and retrieval rules
than those of earlier models (e.g., see Kimball, Smith, & Kahana, 2007).  Although the details of
this model are not critical for current purposes, it is important to note that unlike earlier models in
which associative strength between items and critical lures was the key determinant of false recall
rates, these newer fSAM models also place importance on associations among studied items
(intralist connectivity).  Because of the importance of intralist connectivity, variation in strength
across all of the items on the list, not individual items, becomes more central in determining false
recall rates in these models.  Thus, like the associative-activation theory, newer spreading-
activation models would also predict no differences in false recall rates as a function of whether
one strong item or several weaker items were removed from the list, just the overall associative
strength of the list.
3Research has shown that recall probabilities can be well described by the strength of inter-item
connections in networks that include connections between, for example, cues (items) and targets
(lures) and the organization between the cues (items) themselves.  Nelson and Zhang (2000)
demonstrated that it is possible to calculate an activation strength index that integrates these
different forms of associations (e.g., the association between items and the critical target or the
association between items themselves).  Most importantly, this activation strength index can be
used to predict recall.  According to Nelson and Zhang (2000) this activation strength index (AS)
can be seen as a parallel activation process involving all connections in an associative network.
These connections contribute additively to strengthening the target word (in our case the critical
lure) and its associates.  In other words, AS includes the degree to which items are connected to a
target (lure) plus the degree to which items are connected between themselves (AS = BAS + SD).
For example, the activation of GREEN is determined by the degree to which the related concepts
yellow, blue are associated with GREEN (backward associative strength) plus by the degree to
which yellow and blue are associated.  The degree to which list items are associated with each
other gives an indication of how semantically dense a list is.  In particular, the stronger items are
associated with each other the denser is a list.  In this context, the activation strength (AS) of a
word or critical lure may not only be determined by the amount of backward associative strength
(BAS) but also by the semantic density (SD) of the list items.  Because AS may be an index of
recall probabilities, it was necessary to hold AS constant across lists to obtain independent
estimates of the roles of BAS and SD in children’s true and false recall.  That is, High BAS/High
SD and Low BAS/Low SD conditions were not included because they confound overall activation
strength with the manipulation of interest. Because our interest was focused squarely on the
relative roles of SD and BAS, not overall AS, the only relevant test conditions were High
BAS/Low SD and Low BAS/High SD, the only two conditions that can be equated for overall AS.
 In a full, 2 x 2 factorial design we would confound activation strength (e.g., it would be highest in
the High BAS/High SD condition, moderate in the High BAS/Low SD and Low BAS/High SD
conditions, and lowest in the Low BAS/Low SD condition) and it would not be possible to draw
any conclusions from the individual components’ contributions to true/false recall independent of
overall activation strength.  With AS held constant, we were able to assess how lists that were
more dominant in SD than in BAS or more dominant in BAS than SD affected true and false
recall, independent of variation in AS.
Table 1
Mean backward and forward associative strength for each variation of category and DRM lists.
|                   |  |Category            |  |DRM                  |
|Associative        |  |MBAS      |MFAS      |  |MBAS      |MFAS      |
|Strength           |  |          |          |  |          |          |
|  High BAS-High FAS|  |.150      |.040      |  |.234      |.062      |
|  High BAS-Low FAS |  |.080      |.020      |  |.235      |.028      |
|  Low BAS-High FAS |  |.070      |.030      |  |.010      |.061      |
Note.   BAS  =  backward associative strength; FAS  =  forward associative strength; MBAS  =
mean backward associative strength of a list; MFAS  =  mean forward associative strength of a
list.
Table 2.  Mean proportion of true and false recall as a function of age and list in
   Experiment 1 (standard errors in parentheses).
|               |                      True      |                      False     |
|               |Recall                          |Recall                          |
|Age            |                                |                                |
|               |DRM Lists      |Category Lists |DRM Lists      |Category Lists |
|5-year-olds    |.14 (.009)     |.22 (.010)     |.10 (.020)     |.17 (.023)     |
|7-year-olds    |.24 (.010)     |.36 (.011)     |.20 (.020)     |.30 (.024)     |
|11-year-olds   |.37 (.010)     |.48 (.011)     |.30 (.020)     |.37 (.024)     |
|18-year-olds   |.65 (.011)     |.69 (.013)     |.44 (.023)     |.38 (.028)     |
Table 3.  Mean proportion of true and false recall as a function of age and associative
   strength in Experiment 1 (standard errors in parentheses).
|            |                               |                                 |
|            |True Recall                    |False Recall                     |
|Age         |                               |                                 |
|                        |High BAS                |High BAS                |
|                        |High FAS                |Low FAS                 |
|5-year-olds             |.17 (.012)              |.19 (.012)              |
|7-year-olds             |.28 (.012)              |.32 (.012)              |
|11-year-olds            |.41 (.012)              |.45 (.012)              |
| 18-year-olds           |.69 (.014)              |.64 (.014)              |
Table 5.  Mean proportion of true recall as a function of age and list in Experiment
   2 (standard errors in parentheses).
|                       |                       |                       |
|Age                    |DRM Lists              |Category Lists         |
|5-year-olds            |.15 (.012)             |.18 (.013)             |
|7-year-olds            |.24 (.012)             |.30 (.012)             |
|11-year-olds           |.36 (.011)             |.44 (.012)             |
|18-year-olds           |.61 (.011)             |.67 (.011)             |
Table 6.  Mean proportion of true and false recall as a function of age and items removed
 in Experiment 2 (standard errors in parentheses).
|            |                               |                                 |
|            |True Recall                    |False Recall                     |
|Age         |                               |                                 |
|               |Intact                          |Strong                          |
|               |                                |Removed                         |
|               |Higher SD      |Higher BAS     |Higher SD      |Higher BAS     |
|5-year-olds    |.24 (.022)     |.16 (.018)     |.03 (.028)     |.05 (.038)     |
|7-year-olds    |.37 (.022)     |.28 (.018)     |.07 (.028)     |.20 (.038)     |
|11-year-olds   |.60 (.021)     |.49 (.017)     |.10 (.027)     |.17 (.037)     |
Figure Caption
Figure 1.  Mean proportion falsely recalled as a function of Age and Strength for
Category lists (Panel A) and DRM lists (Panel B) for Experiment 1.

